Philipp Renner

Personal Details

First Name:	Philipp
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Renner
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pre476
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
	https://sites.google.com/site/phrenner/

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Management School
Lancaster University

Lancaster, United Kingdom
http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/lums/our-departments/economics/
RePEc:edi:delanuk (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

1. Philipp Renner & Karl Schmedders, 2016. "Dynamic Principal-Agent Models," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 16-26, Swiss Finance Institute.

   Cited by:

   1. Dutta, Prajit K. & Siconolfi, Paolo, 2019. "Asynchronous games with transfers: Uniqueness and optimality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 46-75.

2. Kenneth L. JUDD & Philipp RENNER & Karl SCHMEDDERS, 2010. "Finding All Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Static and Dynamic Games with Continuous Strategies," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 10-45, Swiss Finance Institute.

   Cited by:

   1. Che-Lin Su, 2014. "Estimating discrete-choice games of incomplete information: Simple static examples," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 167-207, June.

Articles

1. Philipp Renner & Karl Schmedders, 2015. "A Polynomial Optimization Approach to Principal–Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 729-769, March.
   • Philipp Renner & Karl Schmedders, 2012. "A Polynomial Optimization Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 12-35, Swiss Finance Institute.

   Cited by:

   1. Philipp Renner & Karl Schmedders, 2020. "Discrete‐time dynamic principal–agent models: Contraction mapping theorem and computational treatment," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(4), pages 1215-1251, November.
   2. Singham, D.I., 2019. "Sample average approximation for the continuous type principal-agent problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 275(3), pages 1050-1057.
   3. Philipp Renner & Karl Schmedders, 2017. "Dynamic Principal–Agent Models," Working Papers 203620456, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
   4. Christian Ewerhart, 2014. "An envelope approach to tournament design," ECON - Working Papers 184, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Oct 2015.
      • Ewerhart, Christian, 2016. "An envelope approach to tournament design," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 1-9.
   5. Chang Koo Chi & Kyoung Jin Choi, 2022. "A Dual Approach To Agency Problems: Existence," Working papers 2022rwp-197, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
   6. Bo Chen & Yu Chen & David Rietzke, 2020. "Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(4), pages 1023-1047, June.
   7. Rehbeck, John, 2018. "Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 216-225.
   8. Kirkegaard, René, 2017. "Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 373-387.
   9. Philipp Renner, 2020. "An augmented first-order approach for incentive problems," Working Papers 297498586, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
   10. Daniel Krv{s}ek & Dylan Possamai, 2023. "Randomisation with moral hazard: a path to existence of optimal contracts," Papers 2311.13278, arXiv.org.

2. Eleftherios Couzoudis & Philipp Renner, 2013. "Computing generalized Nash equilibria by polynomial programming," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 77(3), pages 459-472, June.

   Cited by:

   1. Jiawang Nie & Xindong Tang & Lingling Xu, 2021. "The Gauss–Seidel method for generalized Nash equilibrium problems of polynomials," Computational Optimization and Applications, Springer, vol. 78(2), pages 529-557, March.
   2. Rehbeck, John, 2018. "Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 216-225.

3. Kenneth L. Judd & Philipp Renner & Karl Schmedders, 2012. "Finding all pure‐strategy equilibria in games with continuous strategies," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(2), pages 289-331, July.

   Cited by:

   1. Grzybowski, Lukasz, 2005. "Essays on Economics of Network Industries: Mobile Telephony," Munich Dissertations in Economics 5561, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
   2. Ron N. Borkovsky & Paul B. Ellickson & Brett R. Gordon & Victor Aguirregabiria & Gardete Pedro, 2014. "Multiplicity of Equilibria and Information Structures in Empirical Games: Challenges and Prospects," Working Papers tecipa-510, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
      • Ron Borkovsky & Paul Ellickson & Brett Gordon & Victor Aguirregabiria & Pedro Gardete & Paul Grieco & Todd Gureckis & Teck-Hua Ho & Laurent Mathevet & Andrew Sweeting, 2015. "Multiplicity of equilibria and information structures in empirical games: challenges and prospects," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 115-125, June.
   3. Cai,Yongyang & Selod,Harris & Steinbuks,Jevgenijs, 2015. "Urbanization and property rights," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7486, The World Bank.
   4. Fedor Iskhakov & John Rust & Bertel Schjerning, 2014. "Recursive Lexicographical Search: Finding all Markov Perfect Equilibria of Finite State Directional Dynamic Games," Discussion Papers 14-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
      • Fedor Iskhakov & John Rust & Bertel Schjerning, 2016. "Recursive Lexicographical Search: Finding All Markov Perfect Equilibria of Finite State Directional Dynamic Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(2), pages 658-703.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-CSE: Economics of Strategic Management (2) 2016-08-07 2016-08-07
2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2016-08-07 2016-08-07
3. NEP-CMP: Computational Economics (1) 2016-08-07
4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2016-08-07
5. NEP-DGE: Dynamic General Equilibrium (1) 2016-08-07
6. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (1) 2016-08-07
7. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2016-08-07
8. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2016-08-07

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