IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/b/cup/cbooks/9780521138758.html
   My bibliography  Save this book

Coalition Politics and Economic Development

Author

Listed:
  • Nooruddin,Irfan

Abstract

Coalition Politics and Economic Development challenges the conventional wisdom that coalition government hinders necessary policy reform in developing countries. Irfan Nooruddin presents a fresh theory that institutionalized gridlock, by reducing policy volatility and stabilizing investor expectations, is actually good for economic growth. Successful national economic performance, he argues, is the consequence of having the right configuration of national political institutions. Countries in which leaders must compromise to form policy are better able to commit credibly to investors and therefore enjoy higher and more stable rates of economic development. Quantitative analysis of business surveys and national economic data together with historical case studies of five countries provide evidence for these claims. This is an original analysis of the relationship between political institutions and national economic performance in the developing world and will appeal to scholars and advanced students of political economy, economic development and comparative politics.

Suggested Citation

  • Nooruddin,Irfan, 2010. "Coalition Politics and Economic Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521138758.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521138758
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Baccini, Leonardo & Urpelainen, Johannes, 2012. "Legislative fractionalization and partisan shifts to the left increase the volatility of public energy R&D expenditures," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 49-57.
    2. Veerayooth Kanchoochat, 2014. "Coalition Politics and Reform Dynamics in Thailand," GRIPS Discussion Papers 13-26, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
    3. Thomas Edward Flores & Irfan Nooruddin, 2011. "Credible Commitment in Post-Conflict Recovery," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 23, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Baccini, Leonardo & Urpelainen, Johannes, 2012. "Legislative fractionalization and partisan shifts to the left increase the volatility of public energy R&D expenditures," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 45571, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Sharma, Chanchal Kumar, 2017. "Federalism and Foreign Direct Investment: How Political Affiliation Determines the Spatial Distribution of FDI – Evidence from India," GIGA Working Papers 307, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    6. Steven Hall & Misa Nishikawa, 2018. "Alternation of parties in power and economic volatility: testing the rational partisan hypothesis and policy learning hypothesis," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 91-118, May.
    7. Srikrishna Ayyangar & Suraj Jacob, 2014. "Studying the Indian Legislature: What does Question Hour Reveal?," Studies in Indian Politics, , vol. 2(1), pages 1-19, June.
    8. Charles R. Hankla, 2013. "Fragmented Legislatures and the Budget: Analyzing Presidential Democracies," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 200-228, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521138758. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ruth Austin (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.