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On Capital Structure, Risk Sharing And Capital Adequacy In Islamic Banks

Author

Listed:
  • SIMON ARCHER

    (University of Surrey, Guildford, UK)

  • RIFAAT AHMED ABDEL KARIM

    (Islamic Financial Services Board, 3rd floor, Block A, Bank Negara Malaysia Building, Jalan Dato'onn, 50480 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia)

Abstract

Islamic banks do not pay interest on customers' deposit accounts. Instead, customers' funds are placed in profit-sharing investment accounts (PSIA). Under this arrangement, the returns to the bank's customers are their pro-rata shares of the returns on the assets in which their funds are invested, and if these returns are negative so are the returns to the customers. The bank is entitled to a contractually agreed share of positive returns (profits) as remuneration for its work as asset manager; however, if the returns are zero or negative, the bank receives no remuneration but does not share in any loss.In the case of Unrestricted PSIA, the investment account holders' funds are invested (i.e., commingled) in the bank's asset pool together with the bank's shareholders' own funds and the funds of current account holders. In that case, the bank's own funds that are invested in the asset pool are treated the same as those of Unrestricted PSIA holders for profit and loss sharing purposes; however, the shareholders also receive as part of their profit the remuneration earned by the bank as asset manager (less certain expenses not chargeable to the PSIA holders). This remuneration (management fees) represents an important source of revenue and profits for Islamic banks.From a capital market perspective, this arrangement presents an apparent anomaly, as follows: shareholders and Unrestricted PSIA holders share the same asset risk on the commingled funds, but shareholders enjoy higher returns because of the management fees. On the other hand, competitive pressure may induce the bank to forgo some of its management fees in order to pay a competitive return to its PSIA holders. In this way, some of the PSIA holders' asset risk is absorbed by the shareholders. This phenomenon has been termed "displaced commercial risk" [2].This paper analyzes this phenomenon. We argue that, in principle, displaced commercial risk is potentially an efficient and value-creating means of sharing risks between two classes of investor with different risk diversification capabilities and preferences: wealthy shareholders who are potentially well diversified, and less wealthy PSIA holders who are not. In practice, however, Islamic banks set up reserves with the intention of minimizing any need to forgo management fees.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Archer & Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim, 2006. "On Capital Structure, Risk Sharing And Capital Adequacy In Islamic Banks," International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance (IJTAF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(03), pages 269-280.
  • Handle: RePEc:wsi:ijtafx:v:09:y:2006:i:03:n:s0219024906003627
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219024906003627
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ghlamallah, Ezzedine & Alexakis, Christos & Dowling, Michael & Piepenbrink, Anke, 2021. "The topics of Islamic economics and finance research," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 145-160.
    2. Baldwin, Kenneth & Alhalboni, Maryam, 2020. "The impact of profit-sharing investment accounts on shareholders’ wealth," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    3. Kaouther Toumi & Jean-Laurent Viviani & Zeinab Chayeh, 2019. "Measurement of the displaced commercial risk in Islamic Banks," Post-Print halshs-01806496, HAL.
    4. Toumi, Kaouther & Viviani, Jean-Laurent & Chayeh, Zeinab, 2019. "Measurement of the displaced commercial risk in Islamic Banks," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 18-31.
    5. Raoudha Saidani & Neila Boulila Taktak & Khaled Hussainey, 2021. "The Determinants of Investment Account Holders’ Disclosure in Islamic Banks: International Evidence," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(11), pages 1-14, November.
    6. Mohammad Nayeem Abdullah & Emon Kalyan Chowdhury & Rahat Bari Tooheen, 2022. "Determinants of capital structure in banking sector: a Bangladesh perspective," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 2(12), pages 1-19, December.
    7. Jean-Yves Moisseron & Bruno-Laurent Moschetto & Frédéric Teulon, 2015. "Islamic Finance: A Review Of The Literature," Post-Print hal-04194802, HAL.
    8. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-093 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Mansor H. Ibrahim & Siong Hook Law, 2019. "Financial Intermediation Costs In A Dual Banking System: The Role Of Islamic Banking," Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Bank Indonesia, vol. 22(4), pages 531-552, December.
    10. Asma Hkimi & Neila Boulila Taktak, 2022. "Managing the Risks of Investment Deposit Account in Islamic Banks: An Examination of Mudharaba Contract Between MENA and International Markets," Springer Books, in: Abdelghani Echchabi & Rihab Grassa & Welcome Sibanda (ed.), Contemporary Research in Accounting and Finance, pages 195-216, Springer.
    11. Abdullah, Wan Amalina Wan & Percy, Majella & Stewart, Jenny, 2015. "Determinants of voluntary corporate governance disclosure: Evidence from Islamic banks in the Southeast Asian and the Gulf Cooperation Council regions," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 262-279.
    12. Jean Yves MOISSERON & Bruno Laurent MOSCHETTO & Frédéric TEULON, 2014. "Islamic finance: a review of the literature," Working Papers 2014-93, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.

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