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ANn-PERSON RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING GAME

Author

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  • PÄR TORSTENSSON

    (SVERIGES RIKSBANK, Policy and Analysis Division, Financial Stability Department, SE-103 37, Stockholm, Sweden)

Abstract

When Herrero (1985) extends Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-offers bargaining model to the case of three or more players any agreement can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome, given a sufficiently large discount factor. We show that this is not the case when players demand shares for themselves instead of proposing agreements to each other. Although it is possible to rule out agreements, the majority remains to be SPE outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Pär Torstensson, 2009. "ANn-PERSON RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING GAME," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 11(01), pages 111-115.
  • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:01:n:s0219198909002170
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198909002170
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2003. "Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining with Endogenous Protocol," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0305, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Finke & Stefanie Bailer, 2019. "Crisis bargaining in the European Union: Formal rules or market pressure?," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 109-133, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multilateral bargaining; n-person bargaining; subgame perfect equilibria; C78; C72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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