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Computer simulations of voting systems

Author

Listed:
  • Dominique Lepelley

    (GEMMA-CREME, Faculté de sciences économiques et de gestion, Université de Caen, 14032 Caen Cedex, France)

  • Ahmed Louichi

    (GEMMA-CREME, Faculté de sciences économiques et de gestion, Université de Caen, 14032 Caen Cedex, France)

  • Fabrice Valognes

    (Université Notre Dame de Namur, Belgique)

Abstract

All voting procedures are susceptible to give rise, if not to paradoxes, at least to violations of some democratic principles. In this paper, we evaluate and compare the propensity of various voting rules -belonging to the class of scoring rules- to satisfy two versions of the majority principle. We consider the asymptotic case where the numbers of voters tends to infinity and, for each rule, we study with the help of Monte Carlo methods how this propensity varies as a function of the number of candidates.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Fabrice Valognes, 2000. "Computer simulations of voting systems," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 3(01n04), pages 181-194.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:03:y:2000:i:01n04:n:s0219525900000145
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219525900000145
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. David McCune & Erin Martin & Grant Latina & Kaitlyn Simms, 2023. "A Comparison of Sequential Ranked-Choice Voting and Single Transferable Vote," Papers 2306.17341, arXiv.org.
    2. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2020. "Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation," Post-Print hal-02424936, HAL.
    3. Diss, Mostapha & Dougherty, Keith & Heckelman, Jac C., 2023. "When ties are possible: Weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 128-136.
    4. Eric Kamwa, 2019. "On the Likelihood of the Borda Effect: The Overall Probabilities for General Weighted Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Rules," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 519-541, June.
    5. Benoît R. Kloeckner, 2022. "Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in Approval Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(2), pages 423-466, August.
    6. Eric Kamwa & Fabrice Valognes, 2017. "Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(3), pages 375-395.
    7. Harrison-Trainor, Matthew, 2022. "An analysis of random elections with large numbers of voters," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 68-84.
    8. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2019. "Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation," Working Papers hal-02424936, HAL.
    9. Eric Kamwa, 2018. "On the Likelihood of the Borda Effect: The Overall Probabilities for General Weighted Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Rules," Working Papers hal-01786590, HAL.
    10. Dougherty, Keith L. & Heckelman, Jac C., 2020. "The probability of violating Arrow’s conditions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).

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