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Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma

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  • Nikos Nikiforakis
  • Hans-Theo Normann
  • Brian Wallace

Abstract

We use a public‐good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions. Controlling for the average punishment effectiveness of the institutions, we find that asymmetric punishment institutions are as effective in fostering cooperation and are as efficient as symmetric institutions. At the individual level, we find that players with higher punishment effectiveness contribute similar amounts to the public account but have higher earnings and punish more than their weak counterparts.

Suggested Citation

  • Nikos Nikiforakis & Hans-Theo Normann & Brian Wallace, 2010. "Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 76(3), pages 638-659, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:76:y:2010:i:3:p:638-659
    DOI: 10.4284/sej.2010.76.3.638
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    Cited by:

    1. Herbert Ntuli & Anne-Sophie Crépin & Caroline Schill & Edwin Muchapondwa, 2023. "Sanctioned Quotas Versus Information Provisioning for Community Wildlife Conservation in Zimbabwe: A Framed Field Experiment Approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 84(3), pages 775-823, March.
    2. Columbus, Simon & Feld, Lars P. & Kasper, Matthias & Rablen, Matthew D., 2023. "Behavioural Responses to Unfair Institutions: Experimental Evidence on Rule Compliance, Norm Polarisation, and Trust," IZA Discussion Papers 16346, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2022. "The effect of options to reward and punish on behavior in bargaining," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 171-192, February.

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