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Process effects of multistakeholder institutions: Theory and evidence from the Open Government Partnership

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  • Daniel Berliner
  • Alex Ingrams
  • Suzanne J. Piotrowski

Abstract

How does membership in transnational multistakeholder institutions shape states' domestic governance? We complement traditional compliance‐based approaches by developing a process model, focusing on the independent effects of processes associated with institutional membership, but separate from commitments and compliance themselves. These effects can be driven by iterative and participatory institutional features, which are increasingly prevalent in global governance. We apply this model to the Open Government Partnership (OGP), a transnational multistakeholder initiative with nearly 80 member countries, featuring highly flexible commitments and weak enforcement. Although commitments and compliance have generally been limited, a compliance‐focused approach alone cannot account for myriad other consequences globally and domestically, driven by the iterative and participatory features associated with membership. We demonstrate these at work in a case study of Mexico's OGP membership, which contributed to the spread of new norms and policy models, new political resources and opportunities for reformers, and new linkages and coalitions.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Berliner & Alex Ingrams & Suzanne J. Piotrowski, 2022. "Process effects of multistakeholder institutions: Theory and evidence from the Open Government Partnership," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1343-1361, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:16:y:2022:i:4:p:1343-1361
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12430
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