Incentives, challenges, and dilemmas of TANF: A case study

This paper compares the incentives inherent in TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families), the U.S. welfare system in place after the 1996 reforms, with those of TANF's predecessor, AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children), using the experience in one state, Wisconsin, as an example. Is the new program successful in avoiding the “poverty trap” of the old welfare system, in which the marginal tax rates imposed on earnings and benefits were so high that they discouraged work effort outside a narrow earnings range? As women receiving assistance begin working more hours and earning more, income-conditioned benefits (Food Stamps, EITC, Medicaid, and subsidies for child care) are reduced and withdrawn, in effect constituting a “tax” on earnings. Under TANF, there is more support for these families, at least in Wisconsin, and so economic well-being should be higher for most women with earning in this range than it was under AFDC. But marginal tax rates under TANF remain high, and in some income ranges they are higher than under AFDC. Once in the work force, former TANF recipients have earnings over the long run that expose them to very high marginal tax rates, which decrease the benefits of working harder and make it very difficult to gain full eonomic independence. Evidence from other sources suggest that most low-skilled women have earnings in the same range and so are likely to face similar reductions in benefits such as child care subsidies or the EITC as their earnings increase, even if they are not receiving welfare-related benefits. © 2002 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.