IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/amposc/v61y2017i3p657-670.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Identifying the Source of Incumbency Advantage through a Constitutional Reform

Author

Listed:
  • Mariana Lopes da Fonseca

Abstract

This study provides one of the first causal estimates of both the personal and partisan incumbency advantages. Using data on six local elections taking place during the last 20 years in 278 municipalities in Portugal, it relies on a reform introducing mayoral term limits as a natural experiment that creates exogenous variation on the incumbency status of officeholders while holding the incumbency status of the party constant. A new methodology combining two quasi‐experimental methods, the regression discontinuity and the difference‐in‐discontinuities designs, allows for a credible estimation of the independent personal and partisan returns to incumbency. Results causally identify the personal effect as the driver of the incumbency advantage.

Suggested Citation

  • Mariana Lopes da Fonseca, 2017. "Identifying the Source of Incumbency Advantage through a Constitutional Reform," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(3), pages 657-670, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:61:y:2017:i:3:p:657-670
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12287
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12287
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/ajps.12287?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Stommes, Drew & Aronow, P. M. & Sävje, Fredrik, 2023. "On the Reliability of Published Findings Using the Regression Discontinuity Design in Political Science," I4R Discussion Paper Series 22, The Institute for Replication (I4R).
    2. Bartnicki, Sławomir & Alimowski, Maciej & Górecki, Maciej A., 2022. "The anomalous electoral advantage: Evidence from over 17,000 mayoral candidacies in Poland," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    3. Palguta, Ján & Pertold, Filip, 2021. "Political salaries, electoral selection and the incumbency advantage: Evidence from a wage reform," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 1020-1047.
    4. Lewis, Blane D. & Nguyen, Hieu T.M. & Hendrawan, Adrianus, 2020. "Political accountability and public service delivery in decentralized Indonesia: Incumbency advantage and the performance of second term mayors," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    5. Leandro de Magalhaes & Salomo Hirvonen, 2019. "The Incumbent-Challenger Advantage and the Winner-Runner-up Advantage," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 19/710, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    6. Ercio Andres Munoz, 2021. "Incumbency advantage, money, and campaigns: A note on some suggestive evidence from Chile," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 41(3), pages 1203-1211.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:61:y:2017:i:3:p:657-670. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1540-5907 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.