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The Wisconsin Child Support Assurance System: Estimated Effects on Poverty, Labor Supply, Caseloads, and Costs


Author Info

  • Irwin Garfinkel
  • Philip K. Robins
  • Pat Wong
  • Daniel R. Meyer


The economic impact of a child support assurance system (CSAS) is simulated with microdata on custodial families in Wisconsin. The CSAS includes a uniform child support standard, automatic wage withholding, a minimum child support benefit, and wage subsidy for eligible families. The simulation incorporates a model of the labor supply decision representing the custodial parent's choice of whether to participate in CSAS or in the current AFDC system. The results suggest that CSAS can significantly reduce poverty as well as welfare caseloads. If child support collections increase by one-half of the difference between estimated ability to pay child support and current collections, CSAS will be less costly than the current system.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Journal of Human Resources.

Volume (Year): 25 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1-31

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Handle: RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:25:y:1990:i:1:p:1-31

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Cited by:
  1. Rebecca M. Blank & David Card & Philip K. Robins, 1999. "Financial Incentives for Increasing Work and Income Among Low- Income Families," HEW 9902002, EconWPA.
  2. Ian Walker & Yu Zhu, 2004. "Child support liability and partnership dissolution," IFS Working Papers W04/18, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  3. Paul, Gillian & Walker, Ian & Zhu, Yu, 1999. "Child Support Reform : Some Analysis of the 1999 White Paper," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 539, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  4. Daniel Meyer, 1993. "Child support and welfare dynamics: Evidence from Wisconsin," Demography, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 45-62, February.
  5. Ian Walker & Yu Zhu, 2004. "Child Support and Partnership Dissolution: Evidence from the UK," Studies in Economics 0408, Department of Economics, University of Kent.
  6. Maureen A. Pirog & Kathleen M. Ziol-Guest, 2006. "Child support enforcement: Programs and policies, impacts and questions," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(4), pages 943-990.
  7. R. Y. Kim & I. Garfinkel & D. R. Meyer, . "Interaction effects of a child tax credit, national health insurance, and assured child support," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1047-94, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
  8. C. Huang & I. Garfinkel & J. Waldfogel, . "Child Support and Welfare Caseloads," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1218-00, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
  9. D. R. Meyer & R. Y. Kim, . "Incorporating labor supply responses into the estimated effects of an assured child support benefit," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1033-94, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
  10. Irwin Garfinkel & Theresa Heintze & Chien-Chung Huang, 2001. "Child Support Enforcement: Incentives and Well-Being," JCPR Working Papers 215, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.


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