IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v111y2003i3p686-715.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Theory of Involuntary Unrequited International Transfers

Author

Listed:
  • Murray C. Kemp
  • Koji Shimomura

Abstract

The theory of involuntary international transfers (war indemnities) has been constructed on the assumption that the donor and recipient are completely indifferent to each other's well-being. The assumption is hard to justify since usually the transfers closely follow periods during which the countries have been dropping bombs on each other. In the present paper, we rework the theory on the more plausible assumption that the well-being of each country is negatively influenced by the well-being of the other country. It is shown that, contrary to the conventional theory, the donor might benefit at the expense of the recipient, even when local Walrasian stability is imposed.

Suggested Citation

  • Murray C. Kemp & Koji Shimomura, 2003. "A Theory of Involuntary Unrequited International Transfers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 686-715, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:111:y:2003:i:3:p:686-715
    DOI: 10.1086/374183
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/374183
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/374183?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Emily T. Cremers & Partha Sen, 2005. "Transfers and the Terms of Trade in an Overlapping Generations Model," Working papers 138, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    2. Kojun Hamada & Mitsuyoshi Yanagihara, 2014. "Donor Altruism and the Transfer Paradox in an Overlapping Generations Model," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 905-922, November.
    3. Steven Brakman & Charles Van Marrewijk, 2007. "Transfers, Nontraded Goods, and Unemployment: An Analysis of the Keynes-Ohlin Debate," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 39(1), pages 121-143, Spring.
    4. Emily T. Cremers & Partha Sen, 2009. "Transfers, the terms of trade, and capital accumulation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1599-1616, November.
    5. Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu & Majumdar, Baishali, 2004. "Multilateral transfers, export taxation and asymmetry," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 715-725, April.
    6. Emily T. Cremers, 2008. "Transfers, the Terms of Trade and Capital Accumulation," DEGIT Conference Papers c013_018, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
    7. Murray C. Kemp & Ngo Van Long, 2007. "Development Aid in the Presence of Corruption: Differential Games among Donors," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-23, CIRANO.
    8. Murray C. Kemp & Ngo Van Long, 2009. "Foreign Aid in the Presence of Corruption: Differential Games among Donors," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(SI), pages 230-243, May.
    9. Schweinberger, Albert G. & Lahiri, Sajal, 2006. "On the provision of official and private foreign aid," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 179-197, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:111:y:2003:i:3:p:686-715. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.