A Theory of Involuntary Unrequited International Transfers
AbstractThe theory of involuntary international transfers (war indemnities) has been constructed on the assumption that the donor and recipient are completely indifferent to each other's well-being. The assumption is hard to justify since usually the transfers closely follow periods during which the countries have been dropping bombs on each other. In the present paper, we rework the theory on the more plausible assumption that the well-being of each country is negatively influenced by the well-being of the other country. It is shown that, contrary to the conventional theory, the donor might benefit at the expense of the recipient, even when local Walrasian stability is imposed.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 111 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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Other versions of this item:
- Murray C. Kemp & Koji Shimomura, 2002. "A Theory of Voluntary Unrequited International Transfers," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 53(3), pages 290-300.
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- Partha Sen & Emily T. Cremers, 2010.
"Transfers and the Terms of Trade in an Overlapping Generations Model,"
- Emily T. Cremers & Partha Sen, 2005. "Transfers and the Terms of Trade in an Overlapping Generations Model," Working papers 138, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu & Majumdar, Baishali, 2004. "Multilateral transfers, export taxation and asymmetry," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 715-725, April.
- Steven Brakman & Charles van Marrewijk, 2005.
"Transfers, Non-Traded Goods, and Unemployment: An Analysis of the Keynes – Ohlin Debate,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1588, CESifo Group Munich.
- Steven Brakman & Charles Van Marrewijk, 2007. "Transfers, Nontraded Goods, and Unemployment: An Analysis of the Keynes-Ohlin Debate," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 39(1), pages 121-143, Spring.
- Schweinberger, Albert G. & Lahiri, Sajal, 2006. "On the provision of official and private foreign aid," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 179-197, June.
- Murray C. Kemp & Ngo Van Long, 2007. "Development Aid in the Presence of Corruption: Differential Games among Donors," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-23, CIRANO.
- Emily T. Cremers, 2008. "Transfers, the Terms of Trade and Capital Accumulation," DEGIT Conference Papers c013_018, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
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