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Designing Incentives for Heterogeneous Researchers

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  • Nathan Yoder

Abstract

A principal (e.g., the US government) contracts with a researcher with unknown costs (e.g., a vaccine developer) to conduct a costly experiment. This contracting problem has a novel feature that captures the difference between the form of an experiment and the strength of its results: researchers face a problem of information design rather than optimal effort. Using a novel comparative static for Bayesian persuasion settings, I characterize the optimal contract and show how experimentation is distorted by the need to screen researchers. Moreover, I show that there is no loss from contracting on the experiment’s result rather than the experiment itself.

Suggested Citation

  • Nathan Yoder, 2022. "Designing Incentives for Heterogeneous Researchers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(8), pages 2018-2054.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/720072
    DOI: 10.1086/720072
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    Cited by:

    1. Han Wang, 2023. "Contracting with Heterogeneous Researchers," Papers 2307.07629, arXiv.org.
    2. Mark Whitmeyer & Kun Zhang, 2023. "Redeeming Falsifiability?," Papers 2303.15723, arXiv.org.
    3. Kim, Kyungmin & Koh, Youngwoo, 2022. "Auctions with flexible information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 256-281.

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