Information Design in the Holdup Problem
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DOI: 10.1086/704574
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Cited by:
- Mark Armstrong & Jidong Zhou, 2022.
"Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(2), pages 534-577, February.
- Armstrong, Mark & Zhou, Jidong, 2019. "Consumer information and the limits to competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 14162, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Armstrong, Mark & Zhou, Jidong, 2021. "Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition," MPRA Paper 108395, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mark Armstrong & Jidong Zhou, 2019. "Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition," Economics Series Working Papers 888, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Mark Armstrong & Jidong Zhou, 2021. "Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2269, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Armstrong, Mark & Zhou, Jidong, 2019. "Consumer information and the limits to competition," MPRA Paper 97123, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021.
"First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition,"
TSE Working Papers
21-1261, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
- Daniil Larionov & Hien Pham & Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2022_377, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2022. "First best implementation with costly information acquisition," ZEW Discussion Papers 22-064, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Yang, Kai Hao, 2021. "Efficient demands in a multi-product monopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
- Daniel Krähmer, 2024. "The Hold-Up Problem with Flexible Unobservable Investments," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 278, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
- Pak Hung Au & Mark Whitmeyer, 2021. "Attraction Versus Persuasion," HKUST CEP Working Papers Series 202102, HKUST Center for Economic Policy.
- Condorelli, Daniele & Szentes, Balazs, 2020. "Surplus Bounds in Cournot Monopoly and Competition," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1292, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Wanchang Zhang, 2021. "Correlation-Robust Optimal Auctions," Papers 2105.04697, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
- Brian C. Albrecht & Mark Whitmeyer, 2023. "Comparison Shopping: Learning Before Buying From Duopolists," Papers 2302.06580, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
- Mustafa Dogan & Ju Hu, 2022. "Consumer search and optimal information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(2), pages 386-403, June.
- Garrett, Daniel F. & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023.
"Optimal technology design,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
- Daniel F. Garrett & George Georgiadis & Alexey Smolin & Balazs Szentes, 2023. "Optimal technology design," Post-Print hal-04224372, HAL.
- Schottmüller, Christoph, 2023. "Optimal information structures in bilateral trade," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
- Condorelli, Daniele & Szentes, Balazs, 2020. "Surplus Bounds in Cournot Monopoly and Competition," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 62, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
- Condorelli, Daniele, 2022. "A lower-bound on monopoly profit for log-concave demand," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
- Anja Prummer, "undated".
"Discrimination in Promotion,"
Working Papers
905, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Prummer, Anja & Nava, Francesco, 2021. "Discrimination in Promotion," CEPR Discussion Papers 15672, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Vasudha Jain & Mark Whitmeyer, 2021. "Search and Competition with Flexible Investigations," Papers 2104.13159, arXiv.org.
- Anja Prummer & Francesco Nava, 2023. "Value Design in Optimal Mechanisms," Economics working papers 2023-05, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Auctioning Multiple Goods without Priors," Papers 2204.13726, arXiv.org.
- Elliott, M. & Galeotti, A. & Koh, A. & Li, W., 2023. "Matching and Information Design in Marketplaces," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2313, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Information-Robust Optimal Auctions," Papers 2205.04137, arXiv.org.
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