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Taxes versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View

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Author Info
Sanchirico, Chris William

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Abstract

Most law and economic analysis evaluates legal rules solely on basis of the efficiency criterion, the justification being that distributive goals are best accomplished through the tax code. Within the same framework used to formalize this justification, this paper shows that (1) even in the presence of an optimally redistributive tax, any concern for "equity" dictates that legal rules should deviate from efficient standards in a manner that redistributes toward the less well-off: (2) any showing that differences in taxable attributes such as income or wealth are the dominant components of overall inequality would go only to the direction of the proper equity adjustment to legal rules, not to the fact that some adjustment should be made; and (3) the role of equity adjustments to legal rules is not limited to correcting inequalities arising within the legal system but extends to correcting inequalities arising in other areas of the economy. Copyright 2000 by the University of Chicago.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.

Volume (Year): 29 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 797-820
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:29:y:2000:i:2:p:797-820

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  2. Garoupa, Nuno & Stephen, Frank, 2003. "A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement with Legal Aid," CEPR Discussion Papers 4113, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Welfare Economics, Morality and the Law," NBER Working Papers 9700, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2000. "Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of Punitive Damages Cases," Working Papers 0001, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Mar 2001. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Juan José Ganuza & Fernando Gómez, 2003. "Optimal Negligence Rule under Limited Liability," Economics Working Papers 759, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised May 2004. [Downloadable!]
  6. repec:bep:rlecon:3:2007:2:6 is not listed on IDEAS
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