On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence
AbstractThis article studies the implications for the theory of deterrence of (a) the manner in which individuals' disutility from imprisonment varies with the length of the imprisonment term and (b) discounting of the future disutility and future public costs of imprisonment. Two questions are addressed: Is deterrence enhanced more by increasing the length of imprisonment terms or instead by raising the likelihood of imposing imprisonment? What is the optimal combination of the severity and probability of imprisonment sanctions? Copyright 1999 by the University of Chicago.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.
Volume (Year): 28 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS/
Other versions of this item:
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1997. "On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence," NBER Working Papers 6259, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
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- Harel, Alon & Segal, Uzi, 1999.
"Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime,"
Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series
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- Harel, Alon & Segal, Uzi, 1999. "Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1-2), pages 276-312, Fall.
- Entorf, Horst & Meyer, Susanne, 2004. "Kosten und Nutzen des Strafvollzuges: Grundlagen im Rahmen einer rationalen Kriminalpolitik," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 37290, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL).
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2002-12, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
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- Bjerk, David, 2008. "On the role of plea bargaining and the distribution of sentences in the absence of judicial system frictions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-7, March.
- Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt, 1998.
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- Kessler, Daniel P & Levitt, Steven D, 1999. "Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish between Deterrence and Incapacitation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 343-63, April.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2005.
"The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,"
05-004, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Entorf, Horst, 2007. "Evaluation des Maßregelvollzugs: Grundzüge einer Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 35718, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL).
- Alexander Klein, 2000. "Jail or Fine - Let Them Choose," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0337, Econometric Society.
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- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2006. "Public Enforcement of Law," Discussion Papers 05-016, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Chang, Juin-jen & Lai, Ching-chong & Yang, C. C., 2000. "Casual police corruption and the economics of crime:: Further results," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 35-51, March.
- Lambsdorff, Johann & Nell, Mathias, 2007. "Fighting corruption with asymmetric penalties and leniency," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 59, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
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