Secured Debt under Conditions of Imperfect Information
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.
Volume (Year): 21 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS/
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- Tarbalouti, Mr, 2010.
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917, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
- van 't Veld, Klaas T. & Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K., 2000. "Fitting the glass slipper: optimal capital structure in the face of liability," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt5nb497vk, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- John Armour, 2006. "Should we redistribute in insolvency," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp319, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
- Clas BergstrÃ¶m & Theodore Eisenberg & Stefan Sundgren, 2004. "On the Design of Efficient Priority Rules for Secured Creditors: Empirical Evidence from A Change in Law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 273-297, December.
- Stanley D. Longhofer & Stephen R. Peters, 2000. "Protection for whom? creditor conflicts in bankruptcy," Working Paper 9909R, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
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