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Once Bitten, Twice Shy? The Lasting Impact of Enforcement on Tax Compliance

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  • Jason DeBacker
  • Bradley T. Heim
  • Anh Tran
  • Alexander Yuskavage

Abstract

We examine the impact of enforcement on subsequent compliance behavior by taxpayers. Exploiting waves of randomized audits by the Internal Revenue Service from 2006 to 2009, we find three long-run responses by taxpayers. First, audits increase tax payments substantially in following years, but this effect is short-lived when third-party reporting is not available. Second, taxpayers with high income volatility revert to their preaudit behavior quickly. Third, sophisticated taxpayers are affected less by enforcement. These responses reveal how taxpayers perceive the enforcement risk and change their noncompliance according to the dynamics of the information barrier between them and the enforcement agency.

Suggested Citation

  • Jason DeBacker & Bradley T. Heim & Anh Tran & Alexander Yuskavage, 2018. "Once Bitten, Twice Shy? The Lasting Impact of Enforcement on Tax Compliance," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(1), pages 1-35.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/697683
    DOI: 10.1086/697683
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gonzalo E. Sánchez, 2022. "Non-compliance notifications and taxpayer strategic behavior: evidence from Ecuador," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 29(3), pages 627-666, June.
    2. Dina Pomeranz & José Vila-Belda, 2019. "Taking State-Capacity Research to the Field: Insights from Collaborations with Tax Authorities," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 755-781, August.
    3. Matthias Kasper & James Alm, 2022. "Does the Bomb-crater Effect Really Exist? Evidence from the Laboratory," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 78(1-2), pages 87-111.
    4. Julie Berry Cullen & Nicholas Turner & Ebonya Washington, 2021. "Political Alignment, Attitudes toward Government, and Tax Evasion," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 135-166, August.
    5. Kasper, Matthias & Alm, James, 2022. "Audits, audit effectiveness, and post-audit tax compliance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 87-102.
    6. Sebastian Beer & Matthias Kasper & Erich Kirchler & Brian Erard, 2019. "Do Audits Deter or Provoke Future Tax Noncompliance? Evidence on Self-employed Taxpayers," IMF Working Papers 2019/223, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Arun Advani, 2022. "Who does and doesn't pay taxes?," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(1), pages 5-22, March.
    8. Konda, Laura & Patel, Elena & Seegert, Nathan, 2022. "Tax enforcement and the intended and unintended consequences of information disclosure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    9. Alex Raskolnikov, 2020. "Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Missing Literature," Supreme Court Economic Review, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 1-59.
    10. Hebous, Shafik & Jia, Zhiyang & Løyland, Knut & Thoresen, Thor O. & Øvrum, Arnstein, 2023. "Do Audits Improve Future Tax Compliance in the Absence of Penalties? Evidence from Random Audits in Norway," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 305-326.
    11. ADEGBIE Folajimi Festus & ALEBIOSU Anthonia Opeyemi & OLAOYE Adebayo Samuel, 2023. "Taxpayers Ethical Behaviour on Faithful Presentation of Financial Statements and Timely Filing of Returns in Deposit Money Banks Listed in Nigeria," International Journal of Research and Scientific Innovation, International Journal of Research and Scientific Innovation (IJRSI), vol. 10(11), pages 196-210, November.
    12. Natasha Sarin & Lawrence H. Summers, 2020. "Understanding the Revenue Potential of Tax Compliance Investment," NBER Working Papers 27571, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Rao, R. Kavita, 2022. "Income Tax data and Facets of transparency," Working Papers 22/384, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
    14. Aloys Prinz, 2019. "Learning (Not) to Evade Taxes," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-18, September.
    15. Knut Løyland & Oddbjørn Raaum & Gaute Torsvik & Arnstein Øvrum, 2024. "Evaluating compliance gains of expanding tax enforcement," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 91(361), pages 142-162, January.
    16. Raga Hudori & Elia Mustikasari, 2020. "The Strength of Audits, Reporting Standards and Corruption, on Tax Evasion: A Cross-Country Study," International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), vol. 0(2), pages 554-567.
    17. Eberhartinger, Eva & Safaei, Reyhaneh & Sureth, Caren & Wu, Yuchen, 2021. "Are risk-based tax audit stretegies rewarded? An analysis of corporate tax avoidance," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 267, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.

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