Long-term Risk-Sharing Wage Contracts in an Economy Subject to Permanent and Temporary Shocks
AbstractThis article develops and tests an implication of risk shifting in labor market impl icit contracts. A two-period implicit contract model is presented. Th e optimal contract, in the face of bankruptcy constraints, calls for a real wage that responds asymmetrically to permanent and temporary s hocks to the firm's revenue function. In particular, the real wage re sponds more to a permanent shock than to a temporary shock of the sam e size. This implication is tested on twelve four-digit Standard Indu strial Classification code industries. Eleven of the twelve industrie s sampled show evidence that supports the asymmetric wage response im plication. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.
Volume (Year): 6 (1988)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/
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- Cardoso, Ana Rute & Portela, Miguel, 2005.
"The Provision of Wage Insurance by the Firm: Evidence from a Longitudinal Matched Employer-Employee Dataset,"
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- Miguel Portela & Ana Rute Cardoso, 2005. "The provision of wage insurance by the firm: evidence from a longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset," NIPE Working Papers 17/2005, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
- Jonathan B. Berk & Richard Stanton & Josef Zechner, 2007.
"Human Capital, Bankruptcy and Capital Structure,"
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- Guertzgen, Nicole, 2009. "Wage insurance within German firms: do institutions matter?," ZEW Discussion Papers 09-043, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
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