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If You Cannot Get Your Friends Elected, Lobby Your Enemies

Author

Listed:
  • Leonardo Felli
  • Antonio Merlo

Abstract

We incorporate campaign contributions in the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying of Felli and Merlo (2006). In equilibrium, lobbies contribute to the electoral campaign of candidates whose policy preferences are aligned with their own. In the event that their preferred candidate does not win the election, lobbies also transfer resources to elected politicians with opposed preferences to induce policy compromise. On the other hand, lobbies never make post electoral transfers to winning candidates whose electoral campaign they supported. (c) 2007 by the European Economic Association.

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  • Leonardo Felli & Antonio Merlo, 2007. "If You Cannot Get Your Friends Elected, Lobby Your Enemies," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(2-3), pages 624-635, 04-05.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:5:y:2007:i:2-3:p:624-635
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence," SocArXiv 47e26, Center for Open Science.
    2. Matter, Ulrich & Roberti, Paolo & Slotwinski, Michaela, 2019. "Vote buying in the US Congress," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-052, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "Sincere Lobby Formation," MPRA Paper 28249, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Roberti, Paolo, 2019. "Citizens or lobbies: Who controls policy?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 497-514.
    5. Keith E. Schnakenberg & Ian R. Turner, 2021. "Helping Friends or Influencing Foes: Electoral and Policy Effects of Campaign Finance Contributions," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 88-100, January.
    6. Zudenkova Galina, 2017. "Lobbying as a Guard against Extremism," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-17, January.
    7. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2019. "Helping Friends or Influencing Foes: Electoral and Policy Effects of Campaign Finance Contributions," SocArXiv nphgu, Center for Open Science.
    8. Jan Klingelhöfer, 2019. "Lobbying And Elections," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 1-17, January.
    9. James Rockey & Nadia Zakir, 2021. "Power and the money, money and the power: A network analysis of donations from American corporate to political leaders," Discussion Papers 21-03, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    10. Klingelhöfer, Jan, 2013. "Lobbying and Elections," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79722, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    11. Bils, Peter & Duggan, John & Judd, Gleason, 2021. "Lobbying and policy extremism in repeated elections," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).

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