Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Credit Constraints, Competition, and Meritocracy

Contents:

Author Info

  • Francesco Caselli

    (London School of Economics,)

  • Nicola Gennaioli

    (University of Stockholm,)

Abstract

This paper studies a simple model of the talent-ownership mismatch-or failure of meritocracy-brought about by credit market imperfections that prevent the transfer of control over productive assets from the untalented rich to the talented poor. We present two main insights. First, there may be multiple equilibria in the degree of meritocracy. Second, the severity of the misallocation of talent depends on the degree of concentration on the good market. Hence, reforms that improve the workings of the credit market (such as better enforcement of contracts), and reforms that reduce concentration (such as deregulation) are to some degree substitutes in bringing about greater meritocracy. We also examine which reform strategy is more likely to enhance efficiency without violating political constraints. (JEL: G3, O10, O47) Copyright (c) 2005 The European Economic Association.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1542-4774/issues
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.

Volume (Year): 3 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (04/05)
Pages: 679-689

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:3:y:2005:i:2-3:p:679-689

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/jeea

Order Information:
Web: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/jeea

Related research

Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Francesco Caselli & Nicola Gennaioli, 2006. "Dynastic Management," CEP Discussion Papers dp0741, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  2. Simon C. Parker & C. Mirjam van Praag, 2006. "The Entrepreneur's Mode of Entry: Business Takeover or New Venture Start?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-089/3, Tinbergen Institute.
  3. repec:dgr:uvatin:2006089 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Benazzo, Piero, 2010. "Equity Criteria as Instrument to Ensure Sustainability of Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency: A Correlation Hidden by Sources of Confounding as Key for Sorting Out the Global Economic Crisis," MPRA Paper 23678, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Ponzo, Michela & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2008. "The Use of Informal Networks in Italian Labor Markets: Efficiency or Favoritisms?," MPRA Paper 11764, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Lofstrom, Magnus & Bates, Timothy & Parker, Simon C., 2014. "Why are some people more likely to become small-businesses owners than others: Entrepreneurship entry and industry-specific barriers," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 232-251.
  7. Kim, Se-Um, 2008. "The Technological Origins of the High School Movement," MPRA Paper 12087, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:3:y:2005:i:2-3:p:679-689. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Karie Kirkpatrick).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.