Strategic Formation of Airline Alliances
AbstractThis paper looks at the endogenous formation of airline alliances by means of a two-stage game where first airlines decide whether to form an alliance and then fares are determined. The authors analyse the effects and the strategic formation of airline alliances when two complementary alliances, following different paths, may be formed to serve a certain city-pair market. Alliances hurt rivals and decrease interline fares. Most interestingly, and contrary to what might be expected, the formation of alliances may be unprofitable in a competitive context. This is likely to happen when competition is significant and economies of traffic density are low. © 2007 LSE and the University of Bath
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by London School of Economics and University of Bath in its journal Journal of Transport Economics and Policy.
Volume (Year): 41 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.bath.ac.uk/e-journals/jtep
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