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Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility

Author

Listed:
  • Bonkoungou, Somouaoga

    (Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland)

  • Nesterov, Alexander

    (Department of Economics and Game Theory Lab, Higher School of Economics, 16, Soyuza Pechatnikov st., 190121, St. Petersburg, Russia)

Abstract

Dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admissions rules in recent years. As the main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited the strategic flaws of the rules in place: students had incentives to game the system. However, after the reforms, almost none of the new rules became strategy-proof. We explain this puzzle. We show that the rules used after the reforms are less prone to gaming according to a criterion called ''strategic accessibility'': each reform expands the set of schools wherein each student can never get admission by manipulation. We also show that the existing explanation of the puzzle due to Pathak and Sönmez (2013) is incomplete.

Suggested Citation

  • Bonkoungou, Somouaoga & Nesterov, Alexander, 2021. "Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:4137
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bonkoungou, Somouaoga & Nesterov, Alexander, 2023. "Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
    2. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tommy Andersson, 2022. "School Choice," NBER Working Papers 29822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Ayoade, Nickesha & Pápai, Szilvia, 2023. "School choice with preference rank classes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 317-341.
    4. Decerf, Benoit & Van der Linden, Martin, 2021. "Manipulability in school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    5. Kalinin, N. & Kuz'mina, A., 2024. "What could be a dynamical centralized college admission system in Russia," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 62(1), pages 101-115.
    6. Csató, László & Petróczy, Dóra Gréta, 2022. "Hogyan számszerűsíthető az ösztönzéskompatibilitás? Esettanulmány a sport világából [Quantifying incentive compatibility: a case study from the world of sports]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 841-852.
    7. Csató, László, 2022. "Quantifying incentive (in)compatibility: A case study from sports," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 302(2), pages 717-726.
    8. Eduardo Duque & Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez, 2022. "The Strong Effects of Weak Externalities on School Choice," Working Papers wp542, University of Chile, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market design; school choice; manipulability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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