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Information, evolution and utility

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Author Info
Swinkels, Jeroen M. () (Washington University in St. Louis)
Samuelson, Larry () (University of Wisconsin)

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Abstract

Human utility embodies a number of seemingly irrational aspects. The leading example in this paper is that utilities often depend on the presence of salient unchosen alternatives. Our focus is to understand why an evolutionary process might optimally lead to such seemingly dysfunctional features in our motivations and to derive implications for the nature of our utility functions.

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File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20060119/15
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Society for Economic Theory in its journal Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 1 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 119-142
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:166

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Web page: http://econtheory.org

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Related research
Keywords: Evolution; information; internal conflict; self control; temptation; time consistency; utility;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Anton Suvorov & Jeroen van de Ven, 2008. "Goal Setting as a Self-Regulation Mechanism," Working Papers w0122, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
  2. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2004. "Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting," Economics Working Papers 0023, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Kalyan Chatterjee & R. Vijay Krishna, 2005. "Menu Choice, Environmental Cues and Temptation: A “Dual Self” Approach to Self-control," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000576, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  4. Marco Gui & Luca Stanca, 2009. "Television Viewing, Satisfaction and Happiness: Facts and Fiction," Working Papers 167, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2009. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-14.


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