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Independent or lonely? Central banking in crisis

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  • Deborah Mabbett
  • Waltraud Schelkle

Abstract

The financial crisis has called our understanding of central bank independence (CBI) into question. Central banks were praised for bold interventions but simultaneously criticized for overreaching their mandates. Central bankers themselves have complained that they are ‘the only game in town’. We develop the second generation theory of CBI to understand how independence can turn into loneliness when a financial crisis calls for cooperation between fiscal authorities and the central bank. Central banks are protected from interference when there are multiple political veto-players, but the latter can also block cooperation. Furthermore, central banks in multi-veto-player systems operate under legal constraints on their financial stabilization actions. They can circumvent these constraints, but this invites criticism and retribution. More surprisingly, central banks have strategically invoked their constraints to gain cooperation from political authorities.

Suggested Citation

  • Deborah Mabbett & Waltraud Schelkle, 2019. "Independent or lonely? Central banking in crisis," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(3), pages 436-460, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:rripxx:v:26:y:2019:i:3:p:436-460
    DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2018.1554539
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Steininger, Lea & Hesse, Casimir, 2024. "Buying into new ideas: The ECB’s evolving justification of unlimited liquidity," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 357, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    2. Dr. Ulrike Lehr & Maximilian Banning & Prof. Dr. Jürgen Blazejczak & Dr. Dietmar Edler & Dr. Markus Flaute, 2020. "Analyse der deutschen Exporte und Importe von Technologiegütern zur Nutzung erneuerbarer Energien und anderer Energietechnologiegüter," GWS Research Report Series 20-2, GWS - Institute of Economic Structures Research.
    3. Baer, Moritz & Campiglio, Emanuele & Deyris, Jérôme, 2021. "It takes two to dance: Institutional dynamics and climate-related financial policies," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    4. Tim Marple, 2021. "The social management of complex uncertainty: Central Bank similarity and crisis liquidity swaps at the Federal Reserve," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 377-401, April.
    5. repec:agr:journl:v:4(621):y:2019:i:4(621):p:5-18 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Karsten Kohler, 2022. "Capital Flows and the Eurozone's North-South Divide," Working Papers PKWP2211, Post Keynesian Economics Society (PKES).
    7. Iulian Nicolae VASILOIU, 2019. "Expanding the Eurozone. The stage of economic convergence for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, vol. 0(4(621), W), pages 5-18, Winter.
    8. Lea Steininger & Casimir Hesse, 2024. "Buying into new ideas: The ECB’s evolving justification of unlimited liquidity," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp357, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    9. Pape, Fabian & Rommerskirchen, Charlotte, 2024. "Co-working in the collateral factory: analyzing the infrastructural entanglements of public debt management, central banking, and primary dealer systems," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121407, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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