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Political budget cycles and divided government

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  • Sebastian Garmann

Abstract

Political budget cycles and divided government. Regional Studies. This study empirically examines the effect of divided governments on the existence of political budget cycles. It uses a setting at the German municipality level, where divided governments occur frequently and can be clearly disentangled from the underlying political system. In this setting, the executive does not have full discretion over expenditures and tax rates, and needs support from the legislative to manipulate policy before executive elections. The study shows that political budget cycles in expenditures and tax rates are more likely when the same party controls executive and legislative. Under divided government, policy manipulation is significantly smaller.

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastian Garmann, 2018. "Political budget cycles and divided government," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 52(3), pages 444-456, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:regstd:v:52:y:2018:i:3:p:444-456
    DOI: 10.1080/00343404.2017.1316839
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    Cited by:

    1. Manuela Krause & Niklas Potrafke, 2020. "The Real Estate Transfer Tax and Government Ideology: Evidence from the German States," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 76(1), pages 100-120.
    2. Dirk Foremny & Ronny Freier & Marc-Daniel Moessinger & Mustafa Yeter, 2018. "Overlapping political budget cycles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 1-27, October.
    3. José Marcelo Torres Ortega & Jorge Mario Ortega De la Rosa, 2022. "Flypaper Effect: The Colombian Municipalities Case for 2000-2017," Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, Departamento de Economía, issue 97, pages 79-111, July-Dece.
    4. Kyriacou, Andreas P. & Okabe, Tomohito & 岡部, 智人 & Roca-Sagalés, Oriol, 2020. "Conditional Political Budget Cycles: A Reconsideration of the Role of Economic Development," Discussion Paper Series 709, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    5. Torres Ortega, José Marcelo & Ortega De La Rosa, Jorge Mario, 2022. "Efecto flypaper: estudio de caso para los municipios colombianos, periodo 2000-2017," Revista Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, CIE, issue No. 97, pages 79-111, May.
    6. Blane D. Lewis & Adrianus Hendrawan, 2018. "The impact of mayor-council coalitions on local government spending, service delivery, and corruption in Indonesia," Departmental Working Papers 2018-19, The Australian National University, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics.
    7. Lewis, Blane D. & Hendrawan, Adrianus, 2019. "The impact of majority coalitions on local government spending, service delivery, and corruption in Indonesia," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 178-191.
    8. Andreas P. Kyriacou & Tomohito Okabe & Oriol Roca‐Sagalés, 2022. "Conditional political budget cycles: The role of time preference," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(1), pages 67-91, March.

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