A critique of Wolak's evaluation of the NZ electricity market: The incentive to exercise market power with elastic demand and transmission loss
AbstractThis paper is the second in a symposium of papers that examine the 2009 report by Frank Wolak into the New Zealand electricity market. In this paper, we discuss the Report's measures of the ability and incentives of generators to exercise unilateral market power. We show that the construction and interpretation of these measures are highly sensitive to some key assumptions, particularly those concerning the elasticity of demand for electricity in the wholesale market and the amount of transmission loss on the national grid.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal New Zealand Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 46 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (November)
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Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/RNZP20
Other versions of this item:
- Seamus Hogan & Peter Jackson, 2011. "A Critique of Wolak’s Evaluation of the NZ Electricity Market: The Incentive to Exercise Market Power with Elastic Demand and Transmission Loss," Working Papers in Economics 11/09, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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