Group lending and self-help groups: joint benefit as an alternative governance mechanism
AbstractLending to the rural poor in developing economies, although crucial from the perspective of poverty management, is often subjected to severe informational problems. The literature on group lending with joint liability attempts to resolve these problems by making failure more costly for the borrowers. We take a different approach. In a model of lending with moral hazard, we show that rewarding group success by promising a joint benefit can be used as an alternative mechanism to solve informational problems. We also show that, unlike joint liabilitymechanism, this joint-benefit mechanism would ensure higher repayment probability even in the absence of peer-monitoring. Moreover, in this model, the optimal group size can be endogenously determined.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development.
Volume (Year): 17 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/link.asp?target=journal&id=104717
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata & Maitra, Pushkar, 2012.
"Moral hazard and peer monitoring in a laboratory microfinance experiment,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 192-209.
- Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan & Pushkar Maitra, 2008. "Moral Hazard and Peer Monitoring in a Laboratory Microfinance Experiment," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1208, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.