Schelling was an unusual economist and game theorist, although some demur. In some respects, he was a typical Cold War product, but in other ways he deviated strongly. His game theory seems to have served strategic interests well when we consider nuclear deterrence, but not so well, when we look at his involvement in the more conventional war in Vietnam. Why was this so? Why did the success in one arena not transfer onto the other? This paper explores these issues and, in doing so, illuminates the nature of Schelling's contribution to game theory.
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