IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/applec/v42y2010i8p1055-1065.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Options using a collective lottery to ration vaccines during an influenza pandemic

Author

Listed:
  • Sheng-Tung Chen
  • Chih-Ching Yang
  • Wei-Chun Tseng
  • Chi-Chung Chen

Abstract

For many countries, the best way to counter an influenza pandemic is to provide citizens with a pandemic vaccine. However, since the global supply of the vaccines is far smaller than the quantity demanded, how to allocate the limited vaccines can be a very challenging task for them. In this study, we introduce a collective lottery mechanism that allocates vaccines as fairly as the traditional lottery, while also offering more options for family members or those who are close so that they can choose the joint probability of successes that can maximize their welfare. This mechanism thus gives rise to a Pareto improvement over the traditional lottery. Our empirical study uses the US and the UK as examples in sequential collective lotteries that are simulated to prove that such an improvement while maintaining fairness, in fact, exists.

Suggested Citation

  • Sheng-Tung Chen & Chih-Ching Yang & Wei-Chun Tseng & Chi-Chung Chen, 2010. "Options using a collective lottery to ration vaccines during an influenza pandemic," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(8), pages 1055-1065.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:42:y:2010:i:8:p:1055-1065
    DOI: 10.1080/00036840701721091
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00036840701721091
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/00036840701721091?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    RePEc Biblio mentions

    As found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography for Economics:
    1. > Economics of Welfare > Health Economics > Economics of Pandemics > Policy responses > Vaccination

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Shu-Yi Liao & Yu-Ying Lin & Wei-Chun Tseng, 2011. "A Random Rationing Mechanism Which Reduces The Risks Of No Son Left At Home," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(3), pages 265-277.
    2. Wei-chun Tseng & Shuhui Chiu, 2014. "An anti-bullying and keeping-friendship school enrollment lottery," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(1), pages 1-15.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:42:y:2010:i:8:p:1055-1065. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RAEC20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.