A Random Rationing Mechanism Which Reduces The Risks Of No Son Left At Home
AbstractLotteries can be used to meet shortages in military-manpower-demanding situations before and during a large-scale war. By developing a new lottery mechanism that is fair in that everyone has the same success rate, the approach adopted in this paper is able to outperform the traditional lottery by generating extra rents in such a way that brothers or similar close family members can choose to maximize the chance that at least one person stays home, thereby reducing social cost. We use 2010 data for three war hot zones - namely, South Korea, Colombia and Taiwan - as examples.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Defence and Peace Economics.
Volume (Year): 22 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/GDPE20
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