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Second-party and third-party punishment in a public goods experiment

Author

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  • Yan Zhou
  • Peiran Jiao
  • Qilin Zhang

Abstract

We experimentally investigate whether third-party punishment is more effective than second-party punishment to increase public goods contribution. In our experiment, third parties first played the standard public goods game and then made punishment decisions as independent bystanders. We find that third parties punished more frequently, severely and less antisocially, resulting in a higher contribution level than that driven by second-party punishment. The third party’s exaggerated emotion towards free riders is proposed to explain their superior punishment effectiveness.

Suggested Citation

  • Yan Zhou & Peiran Jiao & Qilin Zhang, 2017. "Second-party and third-party punishment in a public goods experiment," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(1), pages 54-57, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:24:y:2017:i:1:p:54-57
    DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2016.1161709
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    Cited by:

    1. Quan, Ji & Liu, Wei & Chu, Yuqing & Wang, Xianjia, 2018. "Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 502(C), pages 123-134.
    2. Guerra, Alice & Zhuravleva, Tatyana, 2021. "Do bystanders react to bribery?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 442-462.

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