Optimum committee size: Quality-versus-quantity dilemma
AbstractAccording to Condorcet, the larger the team of decision-makers using the simple majority rule, the more likely they are to reach correct decisions. This paper examines the validity of this claim under the condition of reduced team competence with size. Determining committee size always involves quality-versus-quantity dilemma. This study provides criteria, as well as an algorithm, for deciding on the optimum size of boards and committees. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 20 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (06)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Daniel Berend & Luba Sapir, 2007. "Monotonicity in Condorcet’s Jury Theorem with dependent voters," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 507-528, April.
- Amihai Glazer, 2006. "Predicting Committee Action," Working Papers 050621, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Ruth Ben-Yashar & Mor Zahavi, 2011. "The Condorcet jury theorem and extension of the franchise with rationally ignorant voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 435-443, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.