Simple Arrow-type propositions in the Edgeworth domain
AbstractThis paper presents an Arrow-type result which can be simply demonstrated to hold within the standard domain of welfare economics: in the m×n Edgeworth box, a best allocation must assign all goods to a single individual.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 20 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Note: Received: 4 July 2000/Accepted: 22 October 2001
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