Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

An alternative proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship result


Author Info

  • Shasikanta Nandeibam

    (Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, United Kingdom)

Registered author(s):


    By using a line of reasoning similar to the one used by Gibbard (Gibbard A (1973) Econometrica 41: 587-601) in the deterministic framework, we provide a more transparent and intuitive proof of the following random dictatorship result in the probabilistic framework, which is a corollary credited to H. Sonnenschein of the more general result of Gibbard (Gibbard A (1977) Econometrica 45: 665-681): A decision scheme is Pareto optimific ex post and strategy proof if and only if it is a random dictatorship.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

    Volume (Year): 15 (1998)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 509-519

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:4:p:509-519

    Note: Received: 13 February 1996 / Accepted: 14 April 1997
    Contact details of provider:
    Web page:

    Order Information:

    Related research



    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2003. "Collective Choice under Dichotomous Preferences," Working Papers 2003-09, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    2. Dutta, Bhaskar & Peters, Hans & Sen, Arunava, 2002. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 392-416, October.
    3. Dutta, Bhaskar & Peter, Hans & Sen, Arunava, 2005. "Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 722, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.


    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


    Access and download statistics


    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:4:p:509-519. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.