Migration disequilibrium and specific division rules
AbstractWe examine the extent to which migration equilibria fail to exist in a global economy in which a specific division rule determines the allocation of a perfectly divisible, nondisposable resource among individuals with single-peaked preferences who reside in local economies. In particular, almost without exception, under the egalitarian, proportional, queuing, and uniform division rules, migration equilibria fail to exist for some sets of preferences.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 15 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Note: Received: 23 May 1995 / Accepted: 1 October 1996
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- Anirban Kar & Özgür Kıbrıs, 2008. "Allocating multiple estates among agents with single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 641-666, December.
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