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Bedingte Zahlungsversprechen in der Unternehmenssanierung

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  • Stefan Wielenberg

    (Universität Bielefeld)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung In Sanierungsverfahren von finanziell angeschlagenen Unternehmen werden Kreditforderungen von Gläubigern häufig gegen Besserungsscheine oder Genussrechte umgetauscht. Aus betriebswirtschaftlicher Sicht handelt es sich dabei um bedingte Zahlungsversprechen, weil der Gläubiger nach dem Umtausch während der Laufzeit des Instruments nur unter bestimmten Bedingungen Zahlungen des Schuldners verlangen kann. In diesem Aufsatz wird untersucht, unter welchen Voraussetzungen eine Nachfrage nach diesen Mechanismen besteht. Es stellt sich heraus, dass sowohl Gläubiger als auch Schuldner den Einsatz von Zahlungsversprechen unter idealen Bedingungen begrüßen, weil dadurch ineffiziente Zerschlagungsentscheidungen vermieden werden. Fehlerhafte Investitionsanreize, Nachverhandlungsrisiken und Verifikationskosten wirken sich negativ auf die Einsatzbedingungen von bedingten Zahlungsversprechen aus, führen aber nicht zu ihrer völligen Untauglichkeit.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Wielenberg, 2006. "Bedingte Zahlungsversprechen in der Unternehmenssanierung," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 270-296, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:58:y:2006:i:3:d:10.1007_bf03371654
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03371654
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Giammarino, Ronald M, 1989. "The Resolution of Financial Distress," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 25-47.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    G33; D82;

    JEL classification:

    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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