Efficient provision of public goods with endogenous redistribution
AbstractWe study a balanced mechanism that is capable of implementing in Nash equilibrium all the Pareto-efficient individually rational allocations for an economy with public goods. The Government chooses a set of weights directly related to the Lindahl prices corresponding to the Pareto-efficient allocation to be implemented. The mechanism then guarantees that initial endowments are re-allocated so that the chosen vector of Lindahl prices is indeed a Lindahl equilibrium, and implements the corresponding Lindahl allocation. Finally, besides being balanced, our mechanism is ‘simple’. Each agent has to declare a desired increase in the amount of public good, and a vector of redistributive transfers of initial endowments (across other agents). Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 8 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (04)
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Other versions of this item:
- Anderlini, L. & Siconolfi, P., 1999. "Efficient provision of public goods with endogenous redistribution," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9912, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
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