Dictatorial voting operators
Abstract
Voting operators map n-tuples of subsets of a given set X of candidates (the voters’ choices) into subsets of X (the social choice). This paper characterizes dictatorial voting operators by means of three conditions (the non-emptiness condition A1, the independence condition A2 and the resoluteness condition A3) motivated by the idea of transferring to the social choice properties common to all the voters’ choices. The result is used to refine Lahiri’s (2001) characterization and to derive dictatorial results in other three types of aggregation problems, in which choice functions are transformed into choice functions, binary relations into choices and binary relations into binary relations. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Review Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 8 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
Pages: 347-358
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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:3:p:347-358
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For corrections or technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
Related research
Keywords: Voting operator; dictator; independence of irrelevant alternatives; social decision function; social choice correspondence;References
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Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Murat Çengelci & M. Sanver, 2010. "Simple Collective Identity Functions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 417-443, April.
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