A Note on Correlated Equilibrium
AbstractThe set of correlated equilibria for a bimatrix game is a closed, bounded, convex set containing the set of Nash equilibria. We show that every extreme point of a maximal Nash set is an extreme point of the above convex set. We also give an example to show that this result is not true in the payoff space, i.e., there are games where no Nash equilibrium payoff is an extreme point of the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 25 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
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- Viossat, Yannick, 2006. "The Geometry of Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria and a Generalization of Zero-Sum Games," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 641, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Peeters, R.J.A.P. & Potters, J.A.M., 1999. "On the Structure of the Set of Correlated Equilibria in Two-by-Two Bimatrix Games," Discussion Paper 1999-45, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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