Greg Engl (Allstate Insurance Company, 51 W. Higgins Road, S. Barrington, IL 60010, USA) Suzanne Scotchmer (Department of Economics and Graduate School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley, CA, 94720 USA)
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In large games with transferable utility, core payoffs satisfy a comparative statics property: If the proportion of one type of player increases, then the core payoff to that type of player decreases (does not increase). Markets with transferable utility satisfy a similar property: if the aggregate supply of a commodity increases, its value relative to the value of all commodities decreases. In market games, if one type of agent becomes more plentiful, his competitive payoff falls, and its decrease is engineered by a decrease in the relative value of his endowment.
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
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Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna H. Wooders, 1999.
"A law of scarcity for games,"
Working Papers
mwooders-00-05, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
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