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Nash and Walras equilibrium via Brouwer

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  • John Geanakoplos
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s001990000076
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 21 (2003)
    Issue (Month): 2 (03)
    Pages: 585-603

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:21:y:2003:i:2:p:585-603

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    Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

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    Related research

    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Equilibrium; Nash; Walras; Brouwer; Kakutani.; JEL Classification Numbers: C6; C62.;

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    Cited by:
    1. Claus-Jochen Haake & Francis Edward Su, 2006. "A simplicial algorithm approach to Nash equilibria in concave games," Working Papers 382, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
    2. Luc Lauwers, 2009. "The topological approach to the aggregation of preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 449-476, September.
    3. Kalandrakis, Tasos, 2004. "Equilibria in sequential bargaining games as solutions to systems of equations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 407-411, September.
    4. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald, 2006. "Homotopy Methods to Compute Equilibria in Game Theory," Research Memorandum 046, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    5. Galeazzo Impicciatore & Luca Panaccione & Francesco Ruscitti, 2012. "Walras’ theory of capital formation: an intertemporal equilibrium reformulation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 106(2), pages 99-118, June.
    6. Stauber, Ronald, 2011. "Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 248-274, January.
    7. Ruscitti, Francesco, 2012. "On the boundary behavior of the excess demand function," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(4), pages 371-374.

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