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A resolution of N -person prisoners' dilemma

Author

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  • Ko Nishihara

    (Faculty of Economics, Fukuoka University, 8-19-1, Nanakuma, Jonan-ku, Fukuoka 814-80, JAPAN)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show that cooperation is possible in N-person prisoners' dilemma if players have incomplete information on the order of their moves. We consider a modified version of N-person prisoners' dilemma in which players sequentially move in the order determined by Nature, and during the play they get some information about others. We provide an information partition and a condition of payoffs for which cooperation is attained in an equilibrium. Further, for the case that full cooperation is not attained, we examine the largest partial cooperation which is achieved in an equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Ko Nishihara, 1997. "A resolution of N -person prisoners' dilemma," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(3), pages 531-540.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:10:y:1997:i:3:p:531-540
    Note: Received: March 5, 1995; revised version August 11, 1996
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Inarra, Elena & Concepcion Larrea, M. & Saracho, Ana I., 2007. "The supercore for normal-form games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 530-538, January.
      • Iñarra García, María Elena & Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción & Saracho de la Torre, Ana Isabel, 2003. "The Supercore for Normal Form Games," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    2. Caleb Cox & Matthew Jones & Kevin Pflum & Paul Healy, 2015. "Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 441-484, April.
    3. Vyrastekova, Jana & Funaki, Yukihiko, 2018. "Cooperation in a sequential dilemma game: How much transparency is good for cooperation?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 88-95.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities

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