A note on CEO compensation, elimination tournaments and bankruptcy risk
AbstractWe investigate an economy in which firms have different risks to go bankrupt. We observe two things: first, workers in firms with higher bankruptcy risk (bad firms) always work less than workers in good firms. Second, the CEOs of bad firms may nonetheless receive larger wages. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance.
Volume (Year): 6 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (07)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10101/index.htm
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- Timothy Mathews & Soiliou Namoro, 2008.
"Participation incentives in rank order tournaments with endogenous entry,"
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- Soiliou Namoro & Timothy Mathews, 2006. "Participation Incentives in Rank Order Tournaments with Endogenous Entry," Working Papers 250, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2008.
- Soiliou Namoro, 2008. "The Impact of Organizer Market Structure on Participant Entry Behavior in a Multi-Tournament Environment," Working Papers 373, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2008.
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