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Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes in Bankruptcy Games

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  • Sofia Grahn
  • Mark Voorneveld

Abstract

The USA Bankruptcy Code legislates the bankruptcy of firms. Any allocation mechanism that is legal according to the Bankruptcy Code is necessarily population monotonic. Bankruptcy rules yielding a population monotonic allocation scheme in the associated bankruptcy game are characterized by efficiency, reasonability (each claimant receives a nonnegative amount not exceeding his claim), and the thieve property. The thieve property for bankruptcy problems entails that if a claimant manages to escape with his claim, the amount allocated to each remaining claimant is not larger than his share in the original problem. Many bankruptcy rules studied in the literature are efficient, reasonable, self-consistent, and monotonic. Rules satisfying these axioms are shown to yield population monotonic allocation schemes. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Suggested Citation

  • Sofia Grahn & Mark Voorneveld, 2002. "Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes in Bankruptcy Games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 317-329, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:109:y:2002:i:1:p:317-329:10.1023/a:1016316622277
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1016316622277
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    Cited by:

    1. Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo & Iago Núñez Lugilde & Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo & Estela Sánchez Rodríguez, 2023. "Refining the Lorenz‐ranking of rules for claims problems on restricted domains," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(3), pages 526-558, September.
    2. Kampas, Athanasios & White, Ben, 2003. "Selecting permit allocation rules for agricultural pollution control: a bargaining solution," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2-3), pages 135-147, December.
    3. José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez & Josep Peris, 2014. "Mediation in claims problems," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 357-375, November.
    4. Peris, Josep E. & Jiménez-Gómez, José M., 2012. "A Proportional Approach to Bankruptcy Problems with a guaranteed minimum," QM&ET Working Papers 12-7, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
    5. Jesus Fco. Getan Olivan & Jesus Montes & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2006. "On the monotonic core," Working Papers in Economics 155, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    6. Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel & Peris, Josep E., 2014. "A proportional approach to claims problems with a guaranteed minimum," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 232(1), pages 109-116.

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