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Determining Social Preferences In Experimental Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Teodor Sedlarski

    (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Sofia University St Kliment Ohridski)

  • Hristo Marlov

    (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Sofia University St Kliment Ohridski)

Abstract

This article analyzes the concept of social preferences and the existing methods for their determination in experimental economics. Summarized are the results in modern economic literature on reciprocal fairness, inequity aversion, pure altruism and spitefulness from ultimatum, dictator and trust games. The presented findings of economic experiments contradict the notion of rationality implied in neoclassical economics and have the potential to bring about change in mainstream economic theory. Economic agents seem to take into consideration not only their selfish interest, but also the interest and expectations of others. Investigated in detail are various factors that influence social preferences revealed in games like the number of repetitions and players, size of the sum at stake, social distance, sex, property rights, cultural differences, asymmetrical information, and fairness intentions.

Suggested Citation

  • Teodor Sedlarski & Hristo Marlov, 2014. "Determining Social Preferences In Experimental Economics," Yearbook of the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Sofia University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Sofia University St Kliment Ohridski - Bulgaria, vol. 12(1), pages 221-250, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sko:yrbook:v:12:y:2014:i:1:p:221-250
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    experimental economics; reciprocal fairness; inequity aversion; pure altruism; spitefulness; ultimatum games; dictator games; trust games; asymmetrical information; fairness intentions.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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