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Процентная политика Банка России в условиях рецессии балансовых счетов // The Bank of Russia Interest-rate Policy in Terms of Balance Accounts Recession

Author

Listed:
  • S. Andryushin A.

    (Institute of Economics RAS)

  • V. Kuznetsova V.

    (M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University)

  • С. Андрюшин А.

    (Института экономики РАН)

  • В. Кузнецова В.

    (МГУ им. М. В. Ломоносова)

Abstract

The paper shows that the Bank of Russia current interest rate policy is not efficient in conditions of balance accounts recession. Inflation slowing in 2016-2017 is not driving by the Bank of Russia monetary impact measures, but by such factors as speculative capitals inflows, and pressed by it ruble’s revaluation, consumer and investment demand decrease, banks low credit activity. In financial sanctions situation, external inflow of speculative capitals intense pressure on ruble, and balance accounts recession the Bank of Russia should change the monetary policy tools, and enhance coherence of monetary, fiscal, and debt policies. It’s desirable for the Bank of Russia to deploy the financial repression mechanism under quantitative easing program, which approved by the State Duma in the third reading in April 2017. In middle term it allows to form conditions for the Russian economy transition to economic growth, to anchor long term inflation expectations, to resolve the bad debts problem, and to induce the bank’s credit activity for real economy. В статье показано, что в условиях рецессии балансовых счетов существующая процентная политика Банка России является неэффективной. Замедление темпов инфляции в 2016-2017 гг. обусловлено не мерами монетарного воздействия Банка России, а иными факторами: притоками спекулятивного капитала и вызванного этим укреплением курса рубля, снижением потребительского и инвестиционного спроса, низкой кредитной активностью банков. В условиях финансовых санкций, сильного воздействия внешнего притока спекулятивного капитала на рубль и наличия в экономике рецессии балансовых счетов Банку России следует изменить инструментарий монетарной политики и повысить степень согласованности мер денежно-кредитной, бюджетной и долговой политики. Банку России целесообразно запустить механизм финансовых репрессий, реализуемый в рамках программы количественных послаблений, утвержденной в апреле 2017 г. Государственной Думой в третьем чтении. Это позволит в среднесрочной перспективе создать условия для перехода российской экономики к экономике роста, поставить на якорь долгосрочные инфляционные ожидания, способствовать разрешению проблемы плохих долгов и повысить кредитную активность банков в реальной экономике.

Suggested Citation

  • S. Andryushin A. & V. Kuznetsova V. & С. Андрюшин А. & В. Кузнецова В., 2017. "Процентная политика Банка России в условиях рецессии балансовых счетов // The Bank of Russia Interest-rate Policy in Terms of Balance Accounts Recession," Мир новой экономики // The world of new economy, Финансовый университет при Правительстве Российской Федерации // Financial University under The Governtment оf The Russian Federation, issue 4, pages 114-125.
  • Handle: RePEc:scn:wnewec:y:2017:i:4:p:114-125
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    References listed on IDEAS

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