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Leader survival and purges after a failed coup d’état

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  • Malcolm R Easton

    (Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis)

  • Randolph M Siverson

    (Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis)

Abstract

What factors explain variation in the tenure of political leaders who survive a coup d’état? Our main hypothesis is that leaders who survive a coup attempt take the opportunity to purge known and potential rivals while also deterring future coup conspirators. The severity of the purge is also hypothesized to be positively associated with longer post-coup tenures, as potential rivals are eliminated or deterred from future coup attempts. After introducing the topic of the failed coup, and presenting the dataset we developed to measure the level of punishment associated with a failed coup attempt, we offer an analysis of the effect of purges on the survival time of leaders who survive a coup attempt. We find that, conditional on regime type, purging has an effect on lengthening leader tenure, with more severe purges being associated with longer authoritarian tenures. Democratic leaders gain no advantage. Changes in military expenditures do not increase subsequent tenure. We conclude with a discussion of the results as well as what a broader dataset might reveal.

Suggested Citation

  • Malcolm R Easton & Randolph M Siverson, 2018. "Leader survival and purges after a failed coup d’état," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 55(5), pages 596-608, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:joupea:v:55:y:2018:i:5:p:596-608
    DOI: 10.1177/0022343318763713
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bjørnskov, Christian & Freytag, Andreas & Gutmann, Jerg, 2018. "Coups, Regime Transition, and the Dynamics of Press Freedom," Working Paper Series 1225, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    2. Bennett, Daniel L. & Bjørnskov, Christian & Gohmann, Stephan F., 2019. "Coups, Regime Transitions, and Institutional Change," Working Paper Series 1281, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.

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