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Comparison of Sequential and Simultaneous Responding, Matrix, and Strategy Variables in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game

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  • Stuart Oskamp

    (Department of Psychology Claremont Graduate School)

Abstract

This experiment systematically compared the effects of simultaneous responding and sequential responding by subjects, using a 2 x 4 x 2 factorial design. The four strategy conditions were 10% Cooperation, 90% Cooperation, Tit-for-Tat (response- matching with a one-trial lag), and Free-Play (two subjects actually paired). The two PD matrices had average expected payoffs of $.00 and $.025 per trial. Subjects were 160 college freshman women volunteers who served in groups of two or four and were paid for their participation. Overall cooperation was moderately high (56%). The significant findings were a strategy effect (10% Cooperation lowest, then 90% Cooperation, Free-Play, Tit-for-Tat highest), an increase in cooperation across the fifty trials, an interaction of trials with strategies, and an interaction of matrices with response procedures. The latter finding supports the experimental hypothesis that simultaneous and sequential responding do not have equivalent effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Stuart Oskamp, 1974. "Comparison of Sequential and Simultaneous Responding, Matrix, and Strategy Variables in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 18(1), pages 107-116, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:18:y:1974:i:1:p:107-116
    DOI: 10.1177/002200277401800105
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    Cited by:

    1. Ghidoni, Riccardo & Suetens, Sigrid, 2019. "Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games," Other publications TiSEM ff3a441f-e196-4e45-ba59-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Monterosso, John & Ainslie, George & Pamela Toppi Mullen, P. A. -C. & Gault, Barbara, 2002. "The fragility of cooperation: A false feedback study of a sequential iterated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 437-448, August.

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