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Behavior of Land Developers: Planning and the Economics of Information

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  • P V Schaeffer
  • L D Hopkins

Abstract

Previous attempts to describe or model planning behavior have failed to focus on a decision variable for the activity of planning itself. Attempts to use economic theory to explain planning by modeling only the phenomena being planned for have not been useful in explaining or understanding planning behavior. The model developed in this paper for land development planning makes explicit the decision to plan at each stage of the development process. It also makes explicit the plan at each stage, in the form of a contingent set of expected decisions. These strict definitions make possible progress in understanding planning behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • P V Schaeffer & L D Hopkins, 1987. "Behavior of Land Developers: Planning and the Economics of Information," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 19(9), pages 1221-1232, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:envira:v:19:y:1987:i:9:p:1221-1232
    DOI: 10.1068/a191221
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. M. Avriel & A. C. Williams, 1970. "The Value of Information and Stochastic Programming," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 18(5), pages 947-954, October.
    2. Ronald W. Hilton, 1981. "The Determinants of Information Value: Synthesizing Some General Results," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(1), pages 57-64, January.
    3. James C. Ohls & David Pines, 1975. "Discontinuous Urban Development and Economic Efficiency," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 51(3), pages 224-234.
    4. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-574, September.
    5. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    6. Henderson, J Vernon, 1980. "Community Development: The Effects of Growth and Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(5), pages 894-910, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shih-Kung Lai, 2020. "An anatomy of time explicit planning behavior for urban complexity," Environment and Planning B, , vol. 47(5), pages 912-925, June.

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