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The effectiveness of codetermination laws in cooperative and adversarial employment relations: When does regulation have bite?

Author

Listed:
  • Uschi Backes-Gellner

    (University of Zurich, Switzerland)

  • Jens Mohrenweiser

    (Centre for European Economic Research, Germany)

  • Kerstin Pull

    (Tuebingen University, Germany)

Abstract

The German Codetermination Law grants workers of establishments with 200 or more employees the right to have a works councillor who is fully exempted from his or her regular job duties while still paid a regular salary. This article analyses theoretically and empirically how this de jure right to exemption translates into de facto practice, and explicitly takes into account the nature of the employment relations participation regime. It is found that the right of exemption has no effect in cooperative employment relations because exemptions are granted even in the absence of legal rights, but does make a difference in adversarial relations when exemptions are only granted above the threshold where legal rights force employers to do so, i.e. legal rights do make a decisive difference in exactly those situations where the legislators’ intent would not be realized without the right to legal enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Uschi Backes-Gellner & Jens Mohrenweiser & Kerstin Pull, 2015. "The effectiveness of codetermination laws in cooperative and adversarial employment relations: When does regulation have bite?," Economic and Industrial Democracy, Department of Economic History, Uppsala University, Sweden, vol. 36(2), pages 215-238, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ecoind:v:36:y:2015:i:2:p:215-238
    DOI: 10.1177/0143831X13501002
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